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THE INCLUSION OF A TRADE RELATED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE UNDER THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
(GATT)
I. INTRODUCTION
Inadequate international protection of intellectual property
rights, such as patents,1  copyrights,2  trademarks,' trade
. 1990 by Deborah Mall. The author is the winner of the 1989 California State Bar,
Intellectual Property Section Writing Competition for a related paper entitled, Moral Rights
& U.S. Compliance with the Berne Convention.
1. A patent is a right to exclude others from making, using, or selling an invention
within the national territory. Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect
on the U.S. Industry and Trade, United States Int'l Trade Comm'n Pub. Inv. No. 332-245, at
1-2 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter Foreign Protection of IP]. Patents in the United States are pro-
tected under the United States Constitution "to promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1952). Under
U.S. law, utility patents have a term of 17 years from the date of issuance, and design patents
have a term of fourteen years from the date of issuance. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 173 (1952). Patents
are essential for the protection of new products and processes in manufacturing and methods of
use.
2. A copyright is a form of protection provided by a national government to authors of
original works, including literary, dramatic, musical, artistic, and certain other intellectual
works. Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1, at 1-3. Under U.S. law, copyrights are also
protected by the U.S. Constitution and Title 17 of the U.S. Code. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8; 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1976). The owner of the copyright has the exclusive right to
reproduce (in copies or phono records), distribute or prepare derivatives of the copyrighted
work. The owner of the copyright has the exclusive right to perform or display the copyrighted
work publicly. Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1, at 1-3. This right applies to literary,
musical, dramatic and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic or sculptural
works, including individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work. Foreign
Protection of IP, supra note 1, at 1-3.
3. "A trademark is any word, name, symbol or device or any combination thereof,
adopted and used by the manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them
from those manufactured or sold by others." Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1, at 2-1. In
the United States, protection of trademarks is governed by the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 22
(1920). Federal registrations of trademarks have a term of twenty years. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058,
1059 (1920). A trademark "may be renewed for successive periods of twenty years, provided
that the mark is in use in interstate commerce and a specimen proving use is provided to the
Patent and Trademark Office. Nonuse of the mark may be excused under certain circum-
stances." See Masterson, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights When Exporting Goods and
Services: An Overview, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE, COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
(PL.I) (Sept. 17, 1987).
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secrets,4 and semiconductor mask registration,5 has caused global
trade distortions and led to a variety of trade related problems.
Piracy of intellectual property rights runs rampant abroad despite
the fact that ungrateful infringing countries are often afforded pro-
tection of their own intellectual property rights within the injured
country. International law has failed to develop a workable regula-
tory system for the global protection of intellectual property rights.
Several countries have attempted to remedy this situation by en-
acting stricter domestic laws, and entering into bilateral and multi-
lateral international treaties. Despite individual efforts, the present
system still proves inadequate. The major international regimes used
today to protect international intellectual property rights, the Berne
Copyright Convention,6 the Universal Copyright Convention7 and
the Paris Convention,8 do not adequately protect international intel-
4. A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportu-
nity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may
be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or
preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of
customers.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1974) (accepting the definition of the
RESTATEMENT FOURTH OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939)); see also Foreign Protection of
IP, supra note 1, at 1-4. In the United States, the regulation of trade secrets is a function of
state law. However, many states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The use of
trade secrets is preferred over the use of patents to protect technology in quickly evolving high-
technology areas. However, "[u]nlike patents, trade secrets do not convey exclusive rights for a
specific number of years. Rather, their existence depends upon a continued ability to preserve
their confidentiality" (for example, through corporate security measures and confidentiality
clauses in employment, technology licensing distributorship and joint venture agreements).
Masterson, supra note 3, at 4.
5. Semiconductor chips are the essential component of computer and high technology
development. Protection of semiconductor chip layout and design is essentially a new area of
law. In the United States, chips are protected under The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
of 1984. 17 U.S.C. §§ 900-914 (1984). "[Mlask work protection exists for original mask works
fixed in a semiconductor chip product by, or under the authority of, the owner of the mask
work, which have been registered or commercially exploited anywhere in the world." Foreign
Protection of IP, supra note 1, at 1-5. For a definition of "mask work," see infra note 37. The
Act "provides foreign countries with a strong incentive to enact legislation and regulations, or
enter into treaties to protect semiconductor mask works." Masterson, supra note 3, at 10.
6. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of Sept. 9, 1886,
completed, on May 4, 1896, revised 1928, 1967, 1971, effective July 10, 1974 (reprinted in 7
COPYRIGHT 135 (1971)).
7. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324,
216 U.N.T.S. 132, revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868.
8. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of Mar. 20, 1883, as
revised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at the Hague on Nov.
6, 1925; signed at London on June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on Oct. 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on
July 14, 1967, 53 Stat. 1748, T.S. No. 941.
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lectual property rights abroad. These multilateral treaties contain no
effective dispute resolution or enforcement mechanism.9 Domestic
laws are generally ineffective against infringement of intellectual
property rights abroad. The injured country's only recourse is to re-
taliate on the infringing country's exports to their country.10 The
United States has recently brought such retaliatory action against
Brazil 1 and South Korea 2 for infringements of U.S. property
rights.
The need for a new regime to protect intellectual property
rights abroad is increasingly evidenced by the economic damage
caused to industry by the current regime. A 1986 United States In-
ternational Trade Commission (ITC) estimated aggregate world-
wide losses of up to $61 billion due to inadequate international pro-
tection abroad.1 The developed countries, whose high technology in-
dustries depend on the protection of intellectual property rights for
their livelihood, were hardest hit. These industries include technolog-
ically innovative industries such as aerospace, computers, electronics,
automobile and telecommunications; and other stalwarts of industry
such as fashion, sporting goods, footwear, cosmetics, watches, li-
quors, and cassette tapes.
The ITC study showed that the profits lost by American indus-
9. Dam, The Growing Protection of International Protection of Intellectual Property,
21 INT'L LAW. 627, 631 (1987).
10. The United States in Fall of 1988 enacted a new Trade Act. Pub. L. No. 100-418
(1988). The Act revises major areas of intellectual property law. These revisions include pro-
viding intellectual property owvners with new causes of action for infringement by manufactur-
ers who export to the United States. They also require the United States Trade Representative
to step up investigations of countries that deny U.S. manufacturers effective intellectual prop-
erty protection. See also Hoffman & Marcou, Intellectual Property Issues in the New Trade
Bill, 5 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 130 (1988). This provision is currently being referred to as
"Special 301." On May 25, 1989, 35 countries were put on a "Special 301" watch list. These
countries are required to reform their protection of intellectual property rights or risk U.S.
retaliation. USTR Defense Administration's Naming of Japan, India, Brazil Under Super
301, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 21, at 684 (May 31, 1989). It is of interest to note that
these revisions to the Trade Act are being challenged in a General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade dispute settlement panel as a violation of Article III of the GATT. E.C. Official Says
Commission Proposal to GATT Leaves Several Areas Open For Negotiations, 5 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) No. 31, at 1106 (Aug. 3, 1988).
11. On November 13, 1987, President Reagan removed Brazil from the list of countries
eligible for duty free treatment due to Brazil's lack of protection of American software. See
generally Unfair Trade Practices: Brazil Calls U.S. Sanctions Illegal, U.S. Defends Action
Over Patent Policy, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 31, at 1091 (Aug. 3, 1988).
12. In 1986, action was brought against South Korea under Section 301 of the 1974
Trade Act for inadequate intellectual property protection. See generally Senate Passes Legisla-
tion Paving Way to U.S. Membership in Berne Convention, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No.
39, at 1378 (Oct. 12, 1988).
13. Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1.
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try caused a cut back in employment and less incentive for invest-
ment in research and development. Similar problems are suffered by
U.S. trading partners. Former United States Trade Representative
Clayton Yeutter stated that "[W]e could shrink [the U.S.] $170 bil-
lion trade deficit appreciably simply by adding proper protection for
our intellectual property rights around the world."'"
The United States administration has sought to reform interna-
tional trade relations by extending multi-lateral trade rules to the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade5
(GATT).16 Internationally, GATT is the appropriate vehicle for
ameliorating the trade distortions not remedied by the present sys-
tem. GATT contains a dispute resolution mechanism. GATT has
also gained international respect with its past successes in developing
nontariff related codes, for international trade such as the Standards
or Subsidies code.17
A similar set of codes should be negotiated for the protection of
intellectual property rights in the present round of GATT. 8 The
objectives of the GATT intellectual property code should be the
elimination of distortions in the trade in goods by penalizing coun-
tries which fail to respect intellectual property rights, and adopting
effective rules for international property protection.1 9
Effective rules for the protection of intellectual property rights
should be drafted based on minimum standards. These minimum
standards should be adopted from effective treaties ratified and laws
enacted by other countries to deal within their borders with intellec-
tual property rights. The result of this minimum standard would be
to standardize the rules for the international protection of intellectual
property without diminishing stricter domestic standards currently
14. Intellectual Property and Trade Deficit, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 3, at 71
(Feb. 10, 1988).
15. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 61 Stat. pt. 5, A3, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. The leading treatise on GATT is J. JACK-
SON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969). For a more recent work, see K. SIM-
MONDS & B. HILL, LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT (1988).
16. Trade Policy: Annual Council of Economic Advisors Report Sees U.S. in Transi-
tion to Export-led Economy, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 8, at 235 (Feb. 24, 1988) (taken
from a Report of the President's Council of Economic Advisors).
17. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Apr. 12, 1979) (reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, 257 (1979)).
18. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMMITTEE, KEIDANREN AND U.N.I.C.E., BASIC
FRAMEWORK OF GATT PROVISIONS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-A STATEMENT OF
VIEWS OF THE EUROPEAN, JAPANESE AND UNITED STATES BUSINESS COMMUNITIES 18
(June 1988) [hereinafter GATT FRAMEWORK].
19. Id.
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enforced by the various countries.20
The code should be based on a uniform treatment, among all
signatory nations, of intellectual property rights. However, incentives
such as preferential treatment, transition rules and technical assis-
tance should be included in the code to encourage developing and
underdeveloped country's (LDCs) participation.2 These provisions
for offsets to LDCs are important to continued negotiations under
the GATT. The offsets must aim at building production bases for
the LDCs without contributing to the long term erosion of the
LDC's lead in technology. In this way, LDCs can obtain technology
and develop to the standard of technologically developed countries.
Included in the offset should be phase out provisions to be used once
the economy of the LDC has improved.
The purpose of this comment is to show the inadequacies of the
present regime and prove that GATT is the appropriate vehicle for
implementing a new system for the international protection of intel-
lectual property.22 The comment will also attempt to set out a frame-
work for a new code for the international protection of intellectual
property under the GATT.2" This code will embody minimum stan-
dards, based on current effective regulation, for the global protection
of intellectual property rights. The framework will also propose a
specialized dispute resolution to deal with countries infringing on
GATT set standards on intellectual property protection. The focus
will be on reconciling differences between developed countries and
LDCs on the proper uniform standards for the protection of intellec-
tual property rights abroad. In this way, progress can be made on
intellectual property issues as well as other negotiations in the cur-
rent Uruguay Round of the GATT.
II. BACKGROUND
Intellectual property rights are strictly protected within U.S.
borders.24 However, since World War II, countries can no longer
survive through trade within their own boundaries. International
trade has become a priority for local government25 and for manufac-
20. Id. at 18.
21. Id. at 19.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 77-84.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 107-27.
24. See supra notes 1-5.
25. The 100th Congress in Fall of 1988 enacted a more than 1000-page Trade Act in
an effort to take stronger action against unfair, foreign competition. Pub. L. No. 100-418
(1988).
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turers. A global economy has developed where each country gains by
producing what they are best able, and trading on the global market
for their other needs. Individual firms, such as the semi-conductor
producers, have rightly become more concerned with international
competition than domestic competition. Intellectual property protec-
tion is much weaker in many foreign countries even though holders
of intellectual property are afforded the same treatment as a U.S.
citizen or entity in the U.S. market. Piracy of intellectual property
rights throughout the world has distorted international trade by fore-
closing global markets. Piracy has also had devastating impact on the
economies of the developed nations due to the tenor of industry af-
fected in those nations and the facility of violation of intellectual
property rights. Industries are subject to economic damage from in-
fringement of all forms of intellectual property rights, including pat-
ents, trade secrets, copyrights, trademarks and semiconductor mask
works.
A. The Effects of Intellectual Property Violations on Industries
1. Patents
"Patent violations are referred to as patent infringement or
piracy." 6 The industries which would suffer the most harm from
patent piracy are technologically innovative industries: aerospace,
pharmaceuticals, agricultural chemicals, computers and electronics,
industrial equipment, processing and control equipment, motor vehi-
cles and parts, photographic equipment, scientific and medical
equipment and communication industries.27 Patents create a power-
ful incentive to investment because they often assure a profitable
business."8 The piracy of patents has a chilling effect on the indus-
tries which most developed countries depend on for revenue making
and technological advancement.
2. Trade Secrets
The improper acquisition or disclosure of a trade secret is re-
ferred to as misappropriation.29 Improper acquisition includes means
such as theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a
breach of duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic
26. Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1, at 1-4.
27. Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1, at 1-3.
28. Dam, supra note 9, at 629.
29. Foreign Protection offlP, supra note 1, at 2-1.
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or other means.3" Essentially, the same industries affected by patent
piracy are affected by the misappropriation of trade secrets. Damage
caused by the misappropriation of trade secrets is particularly ad-
verse in the evolving high technology areas where the use of trade
secrets are preferred over the use of patents. Unlike a patent, there is
no exclusive right to a trade secret. Holders of trade secrets depend
upon a continued ability to preserve their confidentiality. Once the
confidentiality is betrayed, the value of the trade secret is lost.
3. Copyrights
"Copyright violations are referred to as infringement or
piracy.""1 Copyright infringements have adverse affects on industries
such as printing and publishing, broadcasting, computer software,
entertainment, including motion pictures, music, and all audio and
video recording, as well as character licensing for fashion and fad-
dish goods, including toys and games, wearing apparel, and miscella-
neous consumer goods."' Copyright infringement is easily accom-
plished. For example, cassette tapes88 or software programs3 4 can
easily and inexpensively be copied. The copied product can be made
to appear like the genuine product. The infringer generally spends
little time and money producing a product. Profits obtained from
copyright infringements are often high.
4. Trademarks
A trademark violation is accomplished by counterfeiting. "Other
forms of infringement [of trademarks] include the offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of goods or services using a copy or color-
able imitation of a trade mark or service mark."" "Counterfeiting
activity is most prevalent in industries producing goods wherein a
significant percent of the retail price is supported by a well-known
trademark, such as fashion and sporting wear apparel and footwear,
cosmetics, watches, jewelry, sporting goods, aftermarket automobile
30. Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1, at 1-4.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
32.. Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1, at 2-1.
33. "Twenty-five percent of the two billion records and tapes sold in the world are
counterfeit, with prices in some countries as low as twenty-five percent of the legitimate price."
GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 25.
34. "A copy of a popular $500 U.S. software package can be bought for $7.50." GATT
FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 25.
35. Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1, at 1-2.
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parts, liquors, tobacco products, and blank tapes."" Trademark
counterfeiting can be easily done. Clothes, shoes, luggage, etc. can
easily be stamped with a designer name. Profits are greatly increased
whereas time and money expended by the counterfeiter is virtually
null.
5. Semiconductor Mask Work3 7
Semiconductor mask work violations are referred to as piracy."
Innovation in semiconductor development is of foremost importance
in the ever advancing computer and high technology industries.
Large amounts of money are spent on research and development in
this area. However, semiconductor chip technology is easily and
inexpensively copied. 39
B. The Differing Views of the Developed Countries and the LDCs
The above mentioned industries suffering adverse effects from
the piracy of their intellectual property rights are for the most part
the industries of the developed countries. Enough money exists
within developed countries to fund research and development (R&D)
for further advancement. Unfortunately, there is a lack of an ade-
quate capital base within the LDCs to fund such massive research
and development projects. Piracy allows the LDCs to obtain techno-
logical advancement without expending massive amounts of funding
for R&D. The result has pitted the developed countries against the
LDCs in the effort to improve the international protection of intel-
lectual property rights.' 0 There is no clear mandate to reach an
agreement. The industries of the developed nations continue to suffer
the adverse effects caused by piracy of their intellectual property
36. Foreign Protection ofIP, supra note 1, at 2-1.
37. A mask work is:
[a] series of related images, however fixed or encoded, having or representing
the predetermined three-dimensional pattern of metallic, insulating, or
semiconductor material present or removed from the layers of a semiconductor
chip product, and in which series the relation of the images to one another is
that each image has the pattern of the surface of one form of the semiconductor
chip product.
Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1, at 1-5.
38. Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1, at 1-5.
39. "A new family of semiconductor integrated circuits also costs $100 million or more
to design. Yet, the same chips can be copied for less than $1 million." GATT FRAMEWORK,
supra note 18, at 25.
40. For a further discussion of the conflict between developed countries and LDCs, see
infra text accompanying notes 73-76.
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C. The ITC Report on the Foreign Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights and the Effect on U.S. Industry and Trade
In an effort to better evaluate the effect of inadequate intellec-
tual property protection abroad on domestic industries, former
United States Trade Representative (USTR), Clayton Yeutter, at
the direction of the President, requested the U.S. International
Trade Commission (ITC) to institute investigation No. 332-245,
Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect on
U.S. Industry and Trade.4 According to the study, 193 U.S. firms
estimated world-wide aggregate losses of $23.8 billion in 1986 due to
inadequate intellectual property protection abroad.4 The study
showed, as expected, that the hardest hit were stalwarts of American
industry such as those firms producing scientific and photographic
equipment, computers and software, electronic equipment, entertain-
ment, motor vehicles and parts, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals. The
ITC estimated aggregate world-wide losses of $43 billion to $61 bil-
lion for the year 1986."' These results of the study prompted former
Ambassador Yeutter to remark at a February 26, 1988 press confer-
ence, "[Diespite some recent improvements, international respect for
American intellectual property rights is deplorable, that is why the
Uruguay Round of negotiation [of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] on the trade related aspects of intellectual property rights
is such a high priority for us.""'
The ITC study demonstrated that the lost revenue caused to
U.S. firms by sales of infringing goods abroad represented an aver-
age profit reduction of ten percent. Before income tax, U.S. firms
averaged profits of six percent of sales. The study also showed an
adverse effect on employment due to inadequate protection of intel-
lectual property. Also, due to a loss of sales abroad, firms must cur-
tail production levels. The ITC study reported employment loss by
forty three U.S. firms of 5,300 jobs.'5
In addition to loss of monetary profits, the study showed that
U.S. firms suffer other injuries from inadequate intellectual property
41. "As a part of its study, the USITC sent out a questionnaire to 736 U.S. firms,
including the Fortune 500 companies and other smaller firms in industries that need intellec-
tual property protection." United States Trade Rep. Press Release 88/10 (Feb. 26, 1988).
42. Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1, at viii.
43. Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1, at H-3.
44. United States Trade Rep. Press Release 88/10, at 2 (Feb. 26, 1988).
45. Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1 at 4-13.
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protection abroad. Incentives are reduced for research and develop-
ment of new products if there will be no adequate return on the
product because of counterfeiting. A company may use profits to de-
velop a new product which may some day aid society. However, with
the loss of profits and guarantee of adequate return due to intellec-
tual property right infringement, the development and production of
these products are curtailed. The U.S. firm's goodwill is damaged by
the inferior good produced by the infringing party. Future profits are
lost when the consumer assumes the inferior, counterfeit good is in
fact the real good and loses faith in the product."'
D. The Current International Regime for the Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights Abroad
Reviewing the negative impact on the U.S. and world economy
of inadequate international protection of intellectual property makes
apparent the inadequacies of the current international regime for
protecting intellectual property. The current regime consists of a se-
ries of bilateral and multilateral agreements, too numerous to be dis-
cussed in this comment. Since 1955, multilateral conventions have
prevailed over bilateral conventions for securing intellectual property
rights abroad. 47 There are three major multilateral treaties. The
Berne Convention 48 provides for minimum levels of copyright protec-
tion. The U.S. only recently joined the Berne Convention.49 The
Secretariat for the Berne Convention is the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO).50 Second is the Universal Copyright
Convention (UCC) 51 which deals with rights afforded to authors,
composers, artists and film-makers, but makes no attempt to set a
detailed minimum standard of protection."2 The U.S. adheres to the
UCC, but it is administered by UNESCO53 from which the U.S. has
46. Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1, at 4-1.
47. Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: United States Goals in the Uruguay
Round, 378 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367, 378 (Spring 1988).
48. Berne Convention, supra note 6.
49. On March 1, 1989, the United States became a signatory to the Berne Convention.
The bill was passed by the House on October 12, 1988 and the Senate on October 12, 1988.
H.R. 4262, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), as amended by S. 1301, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988). President Reagan signed into law H.R. 4262 which amends title 17 of the U.S. Code
to implement the Berne Convention.
50. Berne Convention, supra note 6.
51. Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 7.
52. Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT, supra note 47, at 367, 382.
53. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
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withdrawn. 4 Third is the Paris Convention 55 for the international
regulation of patents. The U.S. is a party to the Convention. These
treaties provide inadequate protection since none provide meaningful.
dispute resolution procedures.5"
E. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Negotiations are currently underway to include the regulation
of trade related intellectual property rights under the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).57 The GATT is silent on some
areas, such as intellectual property. Therefore, the Ministers to the
GATT are currently in the process of writing new rules.
GATT is not an international organization, it is a "treaty
mechanism for the establishment and the maintenance of a common
code for international trade."' 65  GATT was established in 1948 by
twenty-three countries seeking to curtail the protectionist actions
which fueled the Depression and were a catalyst to World War H."
There are currently ninety-six signatory countries known as Con-
tracting Parties to the GATT.6" The GATT was created with an
objective of liberalizing world trade through the reduction of trade
barriers and other measures which distort international competition.
Signatories to the GATT agree to uphold the principles of non-dis-
crimination, national treatment of imports, avoidance of quantitative
restrictions on trade, minimal government intervention in the mar-
ket, transparency (open, clear and verifiable practices), and recourse
to consultations to resolve disputes.6"
As a treaty, GATT is unique because it contains a dispute set-
tlement procedure.62 However, "[t]here is no single dispute settle-
ment procedure of general application in the GATT system." '68 Arti-
54. Dam, supra note 9, at 631.
55. The Paris Convention, supra note 8.
56. Dam, supra note 9, at 630.
57. GATT, supra note 15. For a discussion of current negotiations in the GATT con-
cerning intellectual property, see infra text accompanying notes 66-72.
58. K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, supra note 15, at 2.
59. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON THE URUGUAY
ROUND, THE NEW GATT ROUND PRELIMINARY DEVELOPMENT AND FUTURE PLANS: A
REPORT FROM THE ADMINISTRATION 1 (1987).
60. Morrison, The Uruguay Round and the GATT: What They Are and What They
Do, Bus. AM. 6 (June 20, 1988). See also THE GATT AND THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MUL-
TILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 8 (1987).
61. Morrison, supra note 60, at 6.
62. GATT, supra note 15, art. XXIII, 61 Stat. pt. 5, A3, A64-A65, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
at 60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 266-68.
63. K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, supra note 15, at 11 (quoting 0. LONG, LAW AND ITS
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cle XXIII of the GATT gives only an outline of how disputes are to
be settled. When a member country engages in a trade practice in-
consistent with the GATT, the affected member country may seek
redress through the dispute settlement procedure relevant to the vio-
lation. Under the current system when a dispute arises the countries
are required to consult."4 If there is no resolution, the affected coun-
tries must arrange for a meeting of the contracting parties and re-
quest a panel. 5 The panel decides a term of reference and prepares
a report. The report must be unanimously adopted by the con-
tracting parties to the GATT before appropriate remedial actions
may be taken. Many contracting parties to the GATT have grown
frustrated with, the length of time involved in the dispute resolution
process.66 Efforts are underway in the Uruguay Round to shorten
the time frame involved, 67 and to improve the dispute resolution
mechanism. Improvements of the dispute resolution mechanism will
further strengthen the GATT's ability to deal with international
trade related problems.
F. GATT Action on Trade Related Intellectual Property Issues
Since 1948, there have been eight rounds of negotiation held to
add to the original text of the GATT. The last negotiation, the To-
kyo Round, concluded in 1979. Significant headway in the Tokyo
Round was made on an anti-counterfeiting code. The purpose of the
code was to curtail trade in goods bearing counterfeit trademarks.
The counterfeit code allowed signatories to adopt regulations control-
ling the influx of counterfeit goods at the border. However, comple-
LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 71-88 (1987)).
64. GATT, supra note 15, art. XXIII, 61.Stat. pt. 5, A3, A64-65, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
at 60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 266-68.
65. GATT, supra note 15, art. XXIII:2, 61 Stat. pt. 5, A3, A64-65, T.I.A.S. No. 1700
at 60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 268.
66. Recently, signatories have grown increasingly frustrated with the GATT dispute
settlement procedures. This frustration especially results from the length of settlement time
involved in resolving the European Community, "Pasta War" dispute, and the problems in-
volving the U.S./Japan Semiconductor agreement problems. Ironically, the GATT currently
has the quickest international dispute resolution of any agency. The average dispute is resolved
under the GATT in 14 months. Address by Dr. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Legal Officer to the
GATT, on "the Legal Aspects of the Uruguay Round" at California State Bar-International
Law Weekend in San Francisco, California (Nov. 19, 1988) (notes available in a memoran-
dum written on Nov. 21, 1988 in the SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW Office) [hereinafter Ad-
dress by Dr. Petersmann].
67. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
AND TRADE (GATT), URUGUAY ROUND PROGRESS REPORT 17 (Dec. 14, 1988).
[Vol. 30
1990] GENERAL AGREEMENT OF TARIFFS & TRADE 277
tion of the code was held up by the strong objections of the LDCs.68
No other intellectual property issues were discussed in the Tokyo
Round.
In September 1986, the Uruguay Round of negotiations was
launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay. The Ministers meeting on this
occasion adopted a declaration "to clarify GATT provisions and
elaborate as appropriate new rules and disciplines" on intellectual
property rights." 9
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of
principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade
in counterfeit goods, taking into account work already under-
taken in the GATT. These negotiations shall be without
prejudice to other complementary initiatives that may be taken
in the World Intellectual Property Organization and elsewhere
to deal with these matters.7
0
The declaration is wide enough to encompass any path of negotiation
the Ministers might choose to take in the Uruguay Round.
The Montreal Mid-Term Review was held December 5-8,
1988, to evaluate the process made to date on the Uruguay Round.
Agreements were achieved in eleven of the fifteen negotiating groups.
However, the completed agreements were held in abeyance until a
consensus could be reached in the areas of agriculture and intellec-
tual property. The United States and many developed and develop-
ing countries supported incorporation of substantive intellectual
property rules in the GATT." However, some developing countries,
such as Brazil and India, were against the prospect that any type of
intellectual property regulation should be included under the
GATT.7 ' A consensus had to be reached on all elements of the
framework for a GATT intellectual property agreement, including
GATT jurisdiction over trade related intellectual property (TRIP)
regulation, before negotiations could continue.7
After a more than two year deadlock in GATT intellectual
property negotiations, a compromise accord was worked out in April
68. Testimony of Clayton K. Yeutter, United States Trade Rep., Before the Comm. on
Finance, Subcomm. on International Trade, United States Senate (May 14, 1986), reprinted
in U.S. TRADE LAW AND POLICY, 408 COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HAND-
BOOK SERIES 434 (June 15-16, 1987).
69. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, THE NEW GATT ROUND PRELIMINARY DEVELOP-
MENTS AND FUTURE PLANS: A REPORT FROM THE ADMINISTRATION 59 (1987).
70. Id.
71. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 67, at 5.
72. Id. at 6.
73. Id.
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1989, at the conclusion of the midterm review of Uruguay Round
Progress. The compromise stipulated that future negotiations "would
cover 'adequate standards and principles concerning the availability,
scope and use of trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs)'
and means of enforcing them.""' The stumbling block of unanimous
agreement on GATT jurisdiction over TRIP negotiations was effec-
tively removed. Uruguay Round negotiators are now free to put to-
gether a whole framework of proposed international regulations for
policing TRIP violations. 5 Albeit, at the end of the Uruguay Round
a decision will be made on whether GATT ultimately is the appro-
priate forum for a TRIP code.
Recent negotiations on the trade related intellectual property
framework explored including in the GATT such areas as: "effective
border and internal enforcement measures; a dispute settlement
mechanism which takes into account existing GATT procedures and
adapting them to intellectual property; and the application of other
provisions drawn from GATT principles to intellectual property
such as national treatment and transparency. '"76
III. ANALYSIS
The question of how to improve the protection of intellectual
property rights abroad has been the subject of hot international de-
bate. A myriad of key officials of industrialized countries,7 7 such as
74. Indian Proposal Says Developing Countries Should Get Patent, Trademark Con-
cessions, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 29, at 953 (July 19, 1989).
75. Negotiators Break Deadlock in Key Areas, Approve Guidelines For Uruguay
Round Talks, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 15, at 443 (Apr. 12, 1989).
76. Id. at 5.
77. The European Community and Japan presented intellectual property proposals for
the Uruguay Round negotiations on November 24, 1987. Intellectual Property: EC and Ja-
pan Present Intellectual Property Proposals For Uruguay Round Negotiations, 4 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 47, at 1499 (Dec. 2, 1987). The U.S. offered their proposal for
GATT negotiations on October 28, 1987. United States Trade Rep. Press Release 87/37 (Oct.
28, 1987). The EC offered a more comprehensive proposal in July, 1988. Intellectual Prop-
erty: EC Official Says Commission Proposal To GATT Leaves Areas Open For Negotiation, 5
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 31, at 1106, 1107 (Aug. 3, 1988). Three groups (UNICE, the
Brussels-based European business association; Keidanren, the Japanese business group; and
the Intellectual Property Committee, a Washington, D.C.-based coalition of 13 major U.S.
businesses) released a joint report to the GATT on June 1, 1988. U.S., Japanese, European
Business Groups Call For GATT Intellectual Property Code, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
No. 24, at 893 (June 15, 1988). At a December 12-14, 1989 meeting, new proposals were
tabled by the EC, Hong Kong, Australia, and Austria. European Community, Brazil Submit
Proposals to Integrate Intellectual Property Into GATT, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 48,
at 1663 (Dec. 20, 1989). See also endorsements for amending the GATT code to include
intellectual property by: The President's Council of Economic Advisors, Annual Council of
Economic Advisers Report Sees U.S. In Transition to Export Led Economy, 5 INT'L TRADE
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the United States, Japan, and the European Communities, support
the view that the current system should be completely revamped
under the GATT. These officials contend that GATT is a superior
forum for dealing with intellectual property issues because GATT is
equipped with a dispute resolution mechanism and efforts are under
way to strengthen enforcement procedures.78 The LDCs believe that
the GATT exceeds its authority in discussing intellectual property.79
"Third World countries have argued that the World Intellectual
Property Organization-the United Nations body mandated to over-
see copyright and patent matters-should be the forum for such dis-
cussions, and that GATT should concentrate on trade in goods and
services."8 The LDCs and the industrialized countries had not
reached a consensus on the issue. As a result of the compromise
reached in April 1989 at the conclusion of the midterm review of the
Uruguay Round, negotiators are able to bring TRIP negotiations
under the GATT. However, the compromise stipulated that "the ne-
gotiations would be without prejudice to conflicting views of which
international body was competent to implement the results, meaning,
in effect, that this decision would be deferred until the end of the
REP. (BNA) No. 8, at 235 (Feb. 24, 1988); Former United States Trade Rep. Clayton Yeuter,
U.S. Firms Lose Billions Annually to Foreign Piracy, ITC Intellectual Property Study Finds,
5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 9, at 290 (Mar. 2, 1988), and Yeutter Says U.S.-Asia Trade
Basically Sound But Some Practices In Region Need Changing, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
No. 6, at 174 (Feb. 10, 1988); Former Deputy United States Trade Representative Michael
Smith, Cutting Brazil From GSP Wouldn't Jeopardize U.S. Leverage on Informatics, Yeutter
Says, 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 45, at 1426 (Nov. 18, 1987); EC Commission Official
Lodewijk Briet, EC Official Says Commission Proposal to GATT Leaves Several Areas Open
For Negotiation, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 31, at 1106 (Aug. 3,1988); and the Ameri-
can Bar Association, Rendall, Report on Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Within
GATT, 21 INT'L LAW. 1239 (Fall 1987). But see the statement by U.S. Register of Copyrights
Ralph Oman to a House Judiciary subcommittee, where Mr. Oman doubted the ability of
GATT to resolve issues internationally: "While we're hoping for Jaws III, we may get Gums
I." GATT Round Ineffective Way to Resolve Issues Internationally, U.S. Copyright Official
Says, 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 12, at 417 (Mar. 25, 1987).
78. Developing Countries Claim Western Nations Holding Up Progress in the Uru-
guay Round Talks, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 31, at 1066, 1067 (July 27, 1988).
79. India issued a statement at a July 25, 1988 meeting of the Group of Negotiators on
Goods (GNG), one of the two principal sub-bodies of the Trade Negotiations Committee,
which oversees the GATT Uruguay Round. In the statement, GATT was criticized for ex-
ceeding its authority in discussing intellectual property. Id. Brazil had formerly been a strong
objector to TRIP negotiations under the GATT. However, recently Brazil has submitted a
proposal for integrating trade related intellectual property protection into the GATT. Euro-
pean Community, Brazil Submit Proposals to Integrate Intellectual Property Into GATT, 6
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 48, at 1663 (Dec. 20, 1989).
80. E.C. and Japan Present Intellectual Property Proposals for Uruguay Round Ne-
gotiations, 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 47, at 1499 (Dec. 2, 1987).
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Uruguay Round, scheduled for 1990." ' 1
A. GATT is the Appropriate Forum for Dealing With Trade
Related Intellectual Property Issues
Opponents to the inclusion of TRIP provisions in the GATT
argue that the GATT is not the appropriate forum for intellectual
property issues.82 The GATT, they contend, was created to deal in
goods and services, and intellectual property is not "goods." 3 While
the GATT does not contain a specific code dealing with intellectual
property, this does not preclude the Ministers from writing a new
code. Early GATT negotiations centered around tariffs on goods and
services. In the Tokyo Round, considerable progress was made in
non-tariff areas such as government procurement, technical barriers
to trade, customs valuation, import licensing, anti-dumping, and sub-
sidies and countervailing duties. Negotiations are currently being
held in the Uruguay Round to amplify the GATT to include such
areas as trade related investment measures, services and subsidies
and countervailing measures. GATT is an elastic body with the abil-
ity to adapt to changing economic conditions and new trade
problems. An international trade institution is needed at this point in
history to regulate the global economy and to rectify global trade
problems in one forum. If the GATT is to be effective as an interna-
tional trade institution it must address all problems which relate to,
trade. This includes intellectual property issues.
GATT is the appropriate vehicle for improving the protection
of intellectual property rights abroad. The present intellectual prop-
erty regimes, such as the Berne Copyright Convention,84 the Univer-
sal Copyright Convention85 and the Paris Convention, 6 are not suf-
ficient to mitigate the extensive trade distortions and economic
damage' caused by piracy of intellectual property rights.88 Many of
81. GATT Indian Proposal Says Developing Countries Should Get Patent, Trade-
,nark Concessions, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 29, at 953 (July 19, 1989).
82. Address by Russ Lamantia, Office of the United States Trade Representative, at the
California State Bar-International Law Weekend in San Francisco, Cal. (Nov. 19, 1988)
(notes available in a memorandum written on Nov. 21, 1988 in the SANTA CLARA LAW RE-
VIEW Office) [hereinafter Address by Mr. Lamantia].
83. Id.
84. Berne Convention, supra note 6.
85. Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 7.
86. The Paris Convention, supra note 8.
87. For a discussion of economic damage caused by the insufficient protection abroad of
intellectual property rights, see supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
88. UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF
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the countries whose mistreatment of intellectual property rights has
caused trade distortions and economic damage are not party to these
agreements. In addition, "[t]hese intellectual property conventions
were never intended to be used as enforcement mechanisms for intel-
lectual property rights. They do not have effective dispute settlement
provisions."89 The GATT code can be created to embody as mini-
mum standards the attributes of the present regimes. However,
GATT can add teeth to the conventions by supplying dispute settle-
ment provisions and enforcement mechanisms. This will facilitate the
protection of intellectual property rights abroad and lead to a reduc-
tion of trade related intellectual property problems.
Third World nations contend that WIPO, the secretariat of the
Berne Convention, is the appropriate forum for discussing trade re-
lated intellectual property matters. The Ministers from the LDCs
stress that current negotiations under WIPO should be extended
rather than implementing a new set of codes under the GATT.
However, WIPO, as mentioned above, has no authority under the
Berne Convention for effective dispute settlement and enforcement.
WIPO's successes with the resolutions of international intellectual
property, trade related disputes have been relatively few. This is evi-
denced by the current plethora of injury to industries caused by the
infringements of intellectual property rights. Current negotiations
under the GATT in no way undermine the current authority of
WIPO. The declaration of the Ministers on intellectual property ini-
tiatives in the Uruguay Round stated that negotiations under the
GATT would be taken without prejudice to complementary initia-
tives taken by WIPO. 0 Protection of intellectual property rights can
only be improved by GATT initiatives which could essentially bring
GATT contracting parties into the Berne Convention by forcing sig-
natories to adhere to minimum standards chosen from the Berne
Convention.
B. The Inclusion of a Specialized Dispute Resolution Mechanism
within the TRIP Code
The TRIP code should embody a specially created dispute
mechanism in accordance with Article XXIII of the GATT. GATT
has been criticized in the past for lack of an effective dispute resolu-
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1 (Nov. 5, 1987) [hereinafter U.S. FRAMEWORK]. See also
Dam, supra note 54 at 627; GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 27.
89. U.S. FRAMEWORK, supra note 88, at 1.
90. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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tion mechanism. Efforts are currently underway in the Uruguay
Round to improve GATT dispute settlement procedures.91 Creating
a specialized dispute resolution mechanism for TRIP related issues
will circumvent all current problems involving Article XXIII. Dis-
pute resolution under Article XXIII often leads to ambiguous, non-
standardized results. Under a TRIP code specialized dispute resolu-
tion, procedures for enforcement and assignment of specific penalties
only for intellectual property rights infringement could be facilitated.
The dispute resolution mechanism should allow for the estab-
lishment of a single panel of technical experts to address violations of
an individual country's intellectual property rights. Under Article
XXIII, a new panel is established in accordance with each dispute.
This, among other reasons, makes dispute resolution under the
GATT a time consuming process. In this case a panel, schooled on
intellectual property issues, would be easily assembled. Since the
panel is somewhat familiar with intellectual property issues, less
time would be needed to educate the panel on the particular issue
under dispute. This would expedite the issuance of a report to the
GATT, which in turn would expedite the resolution of the dispute
and lead to a more effective solution.
C. Enforcement Procedures
The TRIP code should be created with an eye towards correct
enforcement procedures and assignment of remedies. Border control
procedures similar to the border control formulated in the Anti-
Counterfeiting Code in the Tokyo Round are needed.92 The infring-
inA goods of both the contracting parties and the nonsignatory na-
tions would be stopped at the borders of the signatory nations. This
would curtail infringer's access to foreign markets. Domestic political
pressures that support low standards would be reduced and non-
signatory countries would have incentives to apply more stringent
standards to the protection of intellectual property rights." Access
should be allowed to local courts where remedies could range from
injunctions and monetary awards to criminal penalties. If other rem-
edies fail, the GATT dispute resolution mechanism should be
invoked.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67.
92. The Anti-counterfeiting Code was drafted but not adopted by the GATT Con-
tracting Parties in the Tokyo Round. CALIFORNIA COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE,
THE GATT AND THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 35
(1987).
93. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 34.
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D. Minimum Standards
Opponents to the inclusion of a TRIP code in the GATT argue
that a new set of codes for the protection of intellectual property
rights is unnecessary.94 Articles III " and XX9e of the GATT al-
ready adequately protect intellectual property rights by forcing na-
tional treatment of property rights on signatories.97 However, na-
tional treatment is not substantial for intellectual property right
protection if the infringing countries do not adequately protect intel-
lectual property within their own borders. Most treaties in effect to-
day operate by enforcing national treatment on signatory nations.
These treaties have not proved entirely effective against intellectual
property piracy. Minimum standards must be codified under the
GATT. In this way, all contracting parties to the GATT would be
forced to protect intellectual property rights at least to the extent
provided in the minimum standards.
In addition, intellectual property protection under the GATT
could be expedited by the creation of a new set of codes rather than
adding to existing amendments. The advantage of creating a new
code is that not all GATT parties would have to agree to it. Adding
amendments to the GATT requires the unanimous consent of all
GATT signatories and this is a difficult, time consuming task, which
is not likely to be completed before the termination of the Uruguay
Round.
E. Current Problems in TRIP Negotiations
There are differing views as to what are the actual problems in
current TRIP negotiations. The developed countries' view is that
piracy of intellectual property rights is the problem. The LDCs find
a lack of availability of technology and that the current protection of
intellectual property rights is too extensive. Whereas developed coun-
tries would like to see the trade problem reduced by implementing
substantive standards, LDCs would like to see preferential treatment
and facilitated access to technology.9"
94. Address by Dr. Petersmann, supra note 66. See also Nordic Countries Attempt to
Break Deadlock on Bringing Intellectual Property Into GATT, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
No. 95, at 1402 (Oct. 19, 1988).
95. Article III of the GATT provides for national treatment. GATT, supra note 15,
art. III, 61 Stat. pt. A3, A18-A19, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 48-49, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 205-208.
96. Article XX(d) regulates barriers to legitimate trade. GATT, supra note 15, art.
XX(d). See GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 31.
97. Address by Dr. Petersmann, supra note 66.
98. Address by Dr. Petersmann, supra note 66.
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Among the common objectives of GATT are transparency of
practices and nondiscrimination among countries. However, certain
aspects of the GATT, such as the Enabling Clause,99 legalize vari-
ous types of special and differential treatment in favor of the devel-
oping nations. The current conflict exists because international intel-
lectual property piracy is essentially a trade distortion caused by the
LDCs against the developed nations. The LDCs feel they have the
right to develop by using technology protected by intellectual prop-
erty rights. The LDCs want differential treatment under the
GATT. The developed countries want uniform treatment for all
countries."10
1. Arguments Against Differential Treatment for LDCs
under the TRIP Code
Differential treatment is plausible in some instances when it
leads to development. However, in this instance, differential treat-
ment is essentially impossible. Allowing some countries to not abide
by laws which protect intellectual property rights defeats the exis-
tence of the right. An industry can be injured substantially by one
foreign infringer. Selectively permitting infringement for develop-
ment or for other reasons does nothing to remedy the harm done to
the industry. Enforcement of GATT-TRIP codes must be uniform if
they are to be effective.
The LDCs must be made to realize that inadequate intellectual
property protection, through piracy or differential treatment, hurts
both the holder of the right and the country with inadequate protec-
tion. An adequate economic return to cover the cost of production
and research and development is necessary to finance the next gener-
ation of products. Due to inadequate intellectual property protection,
industries are finding it difficult to generate new capital to finance
new products.' Innovations are stunted at this early stage. The
global economy, including the economies of the LDCs, suffers by
lack of global technological innovation.
Furthermore, a company may decide to develop a product but
stipulate that no exports shall be allowed to countries where exten-
sive infringement of intellectual property rights has occurred. A
99. The Enabling Clause was adopted in the Tokyo Round to legalize various types of
differential treatment in favor of developing nations. GATT, supra note 15, art. XXXVI.
100. Address by Mr. Lamantia, supra note 82.
101. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18; see Foreign Protection of IP, supra note 1,
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LDC may be denied the use of a product which may aid in further
development. Also, "the displacement of legitimately produced goods
and works by high levels of infringement reduces the willingness and
ability of industry to commit to long-term planning and to develop
the next generation of products, processes and services in, and specif-
ically for, those country markets."'1 2 Global efficiency is reduced and
the transfer of technology is impeded to underdeveloped countries.108
Again, it is the LDC which suffers the consequences.
"Infringements of intellectual property rights also have a chil-
ling effect on the development of a local technological infrastruc-
ture.' 0° A technologically advanced work force'05 is necessary for
technological innovation leading to development. When a LDC uses
its work force for copying rather than for innovation, the work force
is not maximized to its full potential. Often the work force leaves the
country to pursue intellectual and creative ventures.' 6 The talent
and energy used to copy protected technological advancements should
be used by the LDC to develop and sell products using their own
inventions, under their own brand names.'
Inadequate protection of intellectual property rights creates an
atmosphere of distrust among the industries of the various countries.
Legitimate subsidiaries, joint ventures and licensing operations will
not be pursued. Lack of trust leads to severe disincentive to invest-
ment and local sub-contracting in that country.' 0 8 Legitimate trans-
fers of technology and investment leading to technological advance-
ment is curtailed and the LDCs again suffer harm rather than good
from intellectual property piracy.
F. Negotiations for Offsets to LDCs
Development for the LDCs should not be neglected by the de-
veloped nations. It is to the developed nation's advantage to aid the
LDCs in solving their problems because the LDCs provide the
102. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 26.
103. "Already, to the extent that reverse engineering is difficult, large firms are keeping
new breakthroughs as trade secrets rather than copyrighting or patenting them. This hampers
the theft of intellectual property, but also slows the diffusion of new knowledge to those who
might benefit from it." C. AHO & J. ARONSON, TRADE TALKS, AMERICA BETTER LISTEN!
51-52 (Council on Foreign Relations 1985).
104. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 27.
105. A technologically advanced work force would consist of scientists, engineers, etc.
106. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 15.
107. General Agreement on Tariffs And Trade Publication, L/5512, July 8, 1983, at 7.
108. Id.
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world with a large export market.10 9 Therefore, offsets such as
pledges for technical assistance and direct investment should be in-
cluded in the code. Good planning must be employed whereas pro-
duction bases could be built for the LDCs without contributing to
the long term erosion of the technical lead of the developed countries.
Negotiations must also take place outside of the GATT and involve
the World Bank, WIPO, and other international organizations." 0
GATT negotiators must consider the needs of the Third World. In
this way, deadlocks in current GATT negotiations can be mitigated.
This would pave the way for a clear mandate towards the establish-
ment of a TRIP code.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Minimum Standards
A new set of codes adopting minimum standards for the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights should be codified under the
GATT. Minimum standards should be derived from synthesis of
currently existing, effective national laws and international treaties
and conventions for the protection of intellectual property rights."1
The GATT Ministers must come to a consensus on what areas of
national laws, treaties and conventions function effectively in the va-
rious areas of intellectual property and bring the results together into
one code. For example, the European Communities Commission," 2
the United States Trade Representative 1 ' and the European, Japa-
nese and United States Business Communities" 4 agree in their Uru-
guay Round proposals that the Berne Convention should be adopted
as a minimum standard for the international protection of copy-
rights. Contracting parties to the TRIP codes must then conform
their national law to act in accordance with the Berne Convention.
Care should be taken that standards of the individual country's
national law will not be lowered by the minimum standards im-
109. See GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, GATT ACTIVITIES 1987 at
13 (June 1988). Forty percent of U.S. exports now go to developing nations. CALIFORNIA
COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 92, at 41; see also C. AHO & J. ARON-
SON, supra note 103, at 36-37.
110. See GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 40.
111. See GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 36; U.S. FRAMEWORK, supra note 83,
at 4.
112. E.C. Presents GATT Proposal, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 28, at 1012
(July 13, 1988).
113. U.S. FRAMEWORK, supra note 88, in annex.
114. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 82.
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posed. In accordance with GATT principles, contracting parties
should provide national treatment to the exports of GATT signato-
ries. "' Stricter standards currently enforced by the various countries
should not be affected by the implementation of the new code.
Signatories whose existing laws do not comport to minimum
standards adopted should agree to amend existing laws to adhere to
the TRIP agreement. Signatories with intellectual property protec-
tion that satisfies or provides better protection than minimum stan-
dards adopted would not have to change their national law.
B. Incentives
1. Offsets
Offsets must be offered to LDCs as incentives to take part in
TRIP negotiations and sign on to the TRIP framework developed.
The TRIP code must embody uniform standards for the enforcement
of intellectual property rights abroad. Offsets in the code would al-
low for uniform treatment but would aid developing and underdevel-
oped countries in their quest towards technological advancement.
Pledges should be made by developed countries to develop plans
for direct investment earmarked for technological development in the
LDC. Direct investment should be made with an aim towards the
maximizing of profits through the globalization of production.
Best efforts should be made to increase bilateral technical assis-
tance programs."' Industrialized countries should individually use
long term planning to share technology. The aim is to build the pro-
duction bases of the LDC, without contributing to a long term ero-
sion of the donor country's lead in technology. Provisions for bilat-
eral technical assistance programs should include safeguard systems
that protect the domestic industry of the industrialized country."'
There should also be included some type of domestic adjustment pro-
gram for the home industry in the industrialized country so that the
technical assistance program does not have protectionist effects.
The LDC should be allowed a transition period to bring their
national laws into step with the GATT set minimum standards. In
this way, the LDCs could currently sign on to the framework re-
quiring adherence to minimum standards within a reasonable
115. GATT, supra note 15, art III.
116. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 39.
117. A safeguard system could be modeled on Article XIX of the GATT. GATT,
supra note 15, art. XIX.
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amount of time."1 '
The code should be equipped with phase out provisions to be
put into effect once the economy of the developed country has im-
proved. Eventually this would allow for undifferentiated treatment of
all countries under the code.
2. Incentives to Nonsignatories of the GATT
Most-favored-nation status would be offered to all signatories of
the TRIP framework. Parties to the GATT-TRIP will enjoy all the
benefits and rights of all the other signatory nations. A signatory
would be afforded national treatment of their exports in the country
of any other signatory nation. 1 9
Provisions should be made in which parties to the agreement
develop procedures which would link access to their market with the
improved protection of intellectual property rights.12 0 In this way,
improved market access can be offered as an incentive to sign on to
the TRIP code.
C. Dispute Resolution Mechanism
A specialized dispute resolution mechanism should be included
in the code to address only intellectual property rights infringement.
This code should be based on the current dispute resolution mecha-
nism found in Article XXIII of the GATT.1
2 1
The dispute resolution mechanism should include provisions for
the formation of a single panel composed of technical experts
1 22
within the GATT. When an intellectual property dispute arises the
panel could easily be assembled. The experts should be schooled in
intellectual property issues so less time would be needed to gather
information on the disputed issue. Realistic retaliatory measures
should be issued by the panel against the offending party. In accor-
dance with Article XXIII, these measures would then be voted on by
the Contracting Parties.
The dispute resolution will be brought into effect by the initia-
tive of the individual parties. In the event that a party to the TRIP
agreement fails to provide adequate intellectual property protection
118. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 39.
119. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 38.
120. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 38.
121. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 31; U.S. FRAMEWORK, supra note 88, at
2.
122. U.S. FRAMEWORK, supra note 88, at 3.
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based on the minimum standards established, a private party would
request its government to use the TRIP dispute resolution mecha-
nism.12 The effect of the agreement will depend on the individual
countries monitoring markets to detect infringing goods. 24
D. Enforcement Procedures
The Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual
Property2' (GATT Framework), which encompasses the views of
U.S. Intellectual Property Committee, the Keidanren in Japan and
the European UNICE, set out enforcement provisions and mecha-
nisms which should be adopted by negotiators of the TRIP frame-
work. The GATT Framework sets out three mechanisms to ensure
and maintain the agreed upon minimum standards. First, owners of
intellectual property rights can compel stopping an infringing prod-
uct at the border.1" Second, owners of an intellectual property right
that comes into contact with an infringing good could seek a remedy
through the local courts.12 7 Third, where owners are unable to ob-
tain a remedy through the court, their own government could invoke
the dispute resolution mechanism in the TRIP code.
The objectives of the enforcement procedure of the code are "to
ensure (a) that existing and improved intellectual property rules in
signatory countries are adequate, effective and expeditiously en-
forced, (b) that such enforcement is impartial and even-handed and
(c) that all parties to the procedures enjoy due process of law. 128
1. Remedies
Under the GATT Framework for a three-tiered enforcement
structure, a choice of remedies is offered to the intellectual property
owner. First, all signatories should enforce border control measures,
such as those explored in the draft work for an Anti-Counterfeiting
Code in the Tokyo Round. This would consist of signatory nations
stopping the infringing goods of both the Contracting Parties and
nonsignatory nations at the border. The infringing party would be
chastised by being cut off from foreign markets for export.129 Second,
123. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 32.
124. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 31.
125. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18.
126. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 32.
127. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 32.
128. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 32.
129. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 34.
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access would be allowed to the local courts where remedies would
include preliminary and final injunctions, monetary awards adequate
to compensate owners of intellectual property, seizure and destruc-
tion of pirated goods and criminal procedures and remedies in the
appropriate cases.' "8 Third, if other remedies are inadequate, the
TRIP dispute resolution mechanism would be invoked. "This proce-
dure would subject member countries to multilateral scrutiny, en-
hance international cooperation and reduce the use of those bilateral
and unilateral actions which might become barriers to legitimate
trade."'
V. CONCLUSION
The Uruguay Round ends in December 1990. Little time re-
mains to negotiate a final TRIP agreement. However, GATT offi-
cials are sanguine regarding the success of current negotiations. At
the end of 1989, Brazil came forward with a proposal and displayed
a willingness to compromise. Brazil had formerly rallied developing
and underdeveloped countries against the inclusion of a TRIP code
in the GATT. A GATT official recently noted:
We are on track with negotiations in the Uruguay Round in the
sense that everyone has now come forward with his plan of how
intellectual property can be integrated into a new trade regime.
This means that 1990 can be devoted to negotiating the chapter
and verse of the proposed agreement on the basis of what we
have in hand. 8 '
A new code to protect trade related intellectual property rights must
be implemented during this round of the GATT. Failure to imple-
ment a TRIP code will augment worldwide damage from infringe-
ments of intellectual property rights. If a remedy is not forthcoming
as a result of the Uruguay Round, then it will be many years into
the future before a similar international code can be worked out.
It is imperative that new international policies now be formu-
lated to accommodate the new global economy. GATT has the po-
tential to be the all encompassing single authority in international
trade. Bringing all trade regulation, including trade related intellec-
tual property issues, under the GATT would strengthen GATT as
an international regulatory body. This would be an incentive for po-
130. U.S. FRAMEWORK, supra note 88, at 4.
131. GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 35.
132. European Community, Brazil Submit Proposals to Integrate Property into GATT,
6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 48, at 1663 (Dec. 20, 1989).
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tential signatories to sign on to the GATT. The end result would be
to facilitate global trade and lead to a stronger global economy.
Deborah Mall

